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Ministers’ Business Appointments and Criminal Misconduct 
Jeremy Horder* 
Abstract: The offence of misconduct in office has an important 
role to play in the deterrence and punishment of corrupt conduct 
engaged in by officials. However, the offence has been under-
used against politicians. There should be a more politically 
engaged approach by the CPS and the courts to change this. 
There should be a greater willingness to charge Ministers whose 
ethical behaviour in taking up lucrative opportunities upon 
leaving office is a gross breach of the public’s trust, even if that 
involves some extension of the scope of the misconduct offence. 
1.The case for using the misconduct offence against Crown servants. 
In English law, the offence of misconduct involves the following 
elements: 
(A) a public officer acting as such; 
(B) wilfully neglects to perform his or her duty and/or wilfully 
misconducts himself or herself; 
-----------------------------------------  
*London School of Economics. I am very grateful to Gabriele Watts, of 
Lincoln’s Inn, for comments on early drafts. 
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(C) to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public's 
trust in the office holder;  
(D) without reasonable excuse or justification.1 
The offence has been widely criticised for its uncertainty and breadth.2 
I will not pursue that criticism here, although I will be concerned in 
due course with one respect in which the offence may in fact be too 
restrictive. By contrast with the offences under the Bribery Act 2010,3 
the misconduct offence does not apply if the relevant part of the 
defendant’s conduct is connected to his or her past performance of a 
public function, rather than taking place while he or she is in public 
office.4  
In so far as the criticisms in terms of uncertainty and breadth 
hold good, though, the brunt of any consequential risk of injustice has 
been borne principally by criminal justice officials, rather than by any 
other category of public official (such as Members of Parliament). For 
example, Sjölin and Edwards’ research has revealed that when the 
offence has been used in an attempt to deter and punish various 
manifestations of sexual misconduct, the defendants are 
                                                          
1
 Attorney-General's Reference (No. 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 868, para 61. 
2
 See e.g. Law Commission, Law Commission, Reforming Misconduct in Public Office: A Consultation Paper (Law 
Com. 229, 2016), at para. 2.18. 
3
 See section 4(3). 
4
 See text at n.69   below for further discussion. 
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overwhelmingly criminal justice officials.5 In their examination of 
reported and unreported cases of this kind, dating back to 2002, 36 
defendants were police officers or police employees, 15 worked in 
prisons, 4 were probation officers, 2 were Council CCTV operators, and 
there was one Church of England cleric and one Court Clerk. Two MPs 
were investigated, but not charged.6  
Something these figures also tell us is that prosecution of the 
offence of misconduct has been used as a way of seeking to mark out 
lines which must in no circumstances be crossed (involving completely 
unacceptable – not just regrettable or inappropriate - conduct), when 
criminal justice officials, in particular, engage in sexual contact in the 
course of their duties. Just as actions in tort have been used to 
vindicate rights, such as a right to education,7 so, over time, the 
prosecution of the criminal law has been used to hammer out certain 
fundamental duties. Perhaps, as Sjolin and Edwards forcefully argue, 
when sexual misconduct by public officials is in issue, it would make 
more sense to seek to perform this task through reform of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003.8  Quite apart from the well-known virtues of 
codification, such a step would also make it possible to take matters 
                                                          
5
 Catarina Sjölin and Helen Edwards, ‘When Misconduct in Public Office is Really a Sexual Offence’ (2017) 81 
Journal of Criminal Law 292. 
6
 Sjölin and Edwards, n. 5  above.  
7
 See e.g. Donal Nolan, ‘New Forms of Damage in Negligence’ (2007) 70 MLR 59. 
8
 Sjölin and Edwards, n.5 above. 
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further, by paying attention to sexual exploitation by those, like 
doctors, holding key powers not only within but also outside public 
office contexts.  
However, Sjolin and Edwards’ analysis raises a broader question. 
Why should the offence of misconduct not be used, in a parallel way, 
to mark out lines that politicians must in no circumstances cross, 
focussing on completely unacceptable conduct relating (for example) 
to the use of office in connection with personal gain? It may be argued 
that there is a special responsibility on prosecutors (in bringing cases 
before the courts) and on the courts (in taking a non-restrictive 
interpretive approach to the law) to use their respective powers to 
undertake this task. Legislators have a purpose of their own to serve - 
minimising the scope and impact of scrutiny of their conduct - in any 
reform of the offence as it applies to politicians.9 Legislators’ risible 
efforts to bring the criminal law to bear on their self-serving financial 
abuses10 have, to date, inspired no confidence that they understand 
the seriousness with which the public regards financial misconduct by 
                                                          
9
 An argument to this effect can be found in Jeremy Horder, Criminal Misconduct in Office: Law and Politics 
(Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2018), chs 2.4 and 4.13. 
10
 I refer to the minor offence Parliament created to deal with the major scandal of fraudulent expenses abuse 
by MPs, under the Parliamentary Standards Act 2010, s.10. 
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MPs, or that they are prepared to create the necessary deterrents to 
engaging in such misconduct.11  
In the eighteenth century, judges and commentators saw the 
application of the criminal law as an equal partner, alongside the use 
of judicial review, as a ‘republican’ means of controlling and deterring 
the abuse of public power.12 For example, Hawkins explains that 
Justices of the Peace may be prosecuted and punished, ‘if they abuse 
the authority with which they are entrusted’,13 and goes on to explain 
the relationship with mere illegality (appropriately dealt with by 
judicial review) thus: 
The Court of King’s Bench…will never grant an information 
against a Justice of the Peace for a mere error in judgment even 
when a Justice does an illegal act…but if they act improperly 
knowingly, an information shall be granted.14 
Similar formulations of the law can be found in a number of eighteenth 
century cases, (with Lord Mansfield often playing a key role) 
developing this close relationship between the role of the criminal law, 
and the law of judicial review, in relation to the supervision of public 
                                                          
11
 See e.g Nicholas Allen and Sarah Birch, Ethics and Integrity in British Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015),who found that whereas only 15% of MPs regarded their use of allowances to employ 
their relatives as a kind of personal corruption, over 54% of the public so regarded it. 
12
 See the discussion in Jeremy Horder, n. 9  above, ch 3. 
13
 Sir William Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, vol ii, BK 2, sec 74. 
14
 Ibid., citing Rex v Jackson (1737) 1 Term Rep 653 (my emphasis). 
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decision-making.15 In R v Young,16 for example, Mr Justice Denison, 
giving the judgment of the King’s Bench  expressed the view that: 
But though discretion does mean (and can mean nothing else but) 
exercising the best of…judgment upon the occasion that calls for 
it; yet, if this discretion be wilfully abused, it is criminal, and 
ought to be under the control of this court.17 
In modern times, judicial review has developed and expanded 
out of all recognition, as a means by which the courts can discharge 
this supervisory function, even in controversial political contexts (as 
when it concerns Ministerial conduct). By contrast, the public role of 
the criminal law has in this respect atrophied. Yet, there is an 
important role in constitutional contexts for the criminal law, and for 
the misconduct offence in particular, in deterring what Hawkins calls 
knowing impropriety, through the threat of punishment. This is where, 
(a) the misconduct is so egregious that it meets the test set out in 
Attorney-General's Reference (No. 3 of 2003),18 and in particular 
where (b) the impropriety is outside the scope of judicial review, and 
there is no other means by which it can effectively be challenged. A 
good example concerns public officials’, and especially Ministers’, 
                                                          
15
 See e.g. R v Young (1758) 1 Burr 556, and the discussion in Jeremy Horder, n. 9 above. 
16
 (1758) 1 Burr 556. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 See n. 1 above. 
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unauthorised decisions to take up lucrative opportunities in the private 
sector, a practice known as ‘revolving out’.19 
2. Ministers’ Paths to Enrichment and The Work of ACoBA 
Get into Parliament, make tiresome speeches; you will have 
great offers; do not accept them at first, then do: then make 
great provision for yourself and your family.20 
Under a ‘republican’ constitution, perhaps MPs would give up all 
sources of income bar their Parliamentary salaries, to focus entirely on 
the promotion of the public interest;21 but we do not live under such a 
constitution. Accepting this, it might nonetheless be possible to insist 
in law that any outside appointment to be taken up (or retained) by an 
MP must first pass a ‘public interest’ test. To be sure, in order to avoid 
undue restraint of trade, such a test would have to encompass the 
need for an MP to find appropriate employment, if not re-elected. 
However, crucially, the test would exclude appointments the sole 
purpose of which is simply to ‘feather one’s nest’. Something along 
these lines, albeit somewhat more restrictive, has been proposed by 
the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee, which has suggested that: 
                                                          
19
 The phrase of Stuart Wilks-Heeg, ‘Revolving Door Politics and Corruption’, in David Whyte (ed), How Corrupt 
in Britain? (London: Pluto Press, 2015), at 136. 
20
 Hans Stanley MP (1721-1780), cited by Jesse Norman, Edmund Burke (William Collins, 2013), at 52. 
21
 See, generally, James A Gardner, ‘Can Political Parties be Virtuous?’ (2000) 100 Columbia Law Review 667; 
Bruce James Smith, Politics and Remembrance: Republican Themes in Machiavelli, Burke and Tocqueville 
(Princeton University Press, 1985). 
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The only justification for a Minister or civil servant taking public 
or private sector employment in a field for which they had 
responsibility is where they might be returning to or continuing 
to work in an occupation or profession where they already had an 
established track record and experience.22 
Currently, in England and Wales, the approach is different. The 
Ministerial Code is (deliberately?) ambiguous on the suggestion made 
by the Committee in the passage just cited. The Code does state that 
it is the public interest that former Ministers should be able to, ‘start a 
new career or resume a former one’ (an unexceptionable point, made 
above), but it also says that it is in the public interest that former 
Ministers, ‘should be able to move into business or into other areas of 
public life’.23 This is a much more open-ended understanding of the 
‘public interest’ that gives far too much freedom for former Ministers 
to act purely for the sake of gain.24  
In that regard, remuneration beyond Parliamentary salary is 
guided by codes of conduct, and in key instances under consideration 
                                                          
22
 HC Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Managing Ministers’ and Officials’ Conflicts 
of Interest: Time for Clearer Values, Principles and Action, 13
th
 Report of Session 2016-17 (HC252, 2017), para 
71. 
23
 Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office, 2018), Annex B. 
24
 The position with civil servants is more complex, because some may only have been recruited on a short-
term basis, and so need much greater freedom to look for employment than a former Minister who will 
remain an MP: see the comments of the Chair of ACoBA, Baroness Browning: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/public-
administration-and-constitutional-affairs-committee/the-role-and-effectiveness-of-acoba-and-the-
independent-adviser-on-ministers-interests/oral/42072.pdf., Q166. 
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here, by the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACoBA).25 
There is no legally binding ethical test that an MP must satisfy before 
taking up an appointment. Further, the guidance offered to MPs is 
focused not on the need positively to satisfy a public interest test, in 
taking up an outside appointment, but – as we will see - more narrowly 
on the need to avoid certain ethical negatives (such as bribery or 
conflicts of interest). That gives MPs, and other public servants, much 
greater scope to glide between the public and private sectors. 
Between 2000 and 2014, no less than 600 former Ministers and high-
level civil servants were appointed to over 1000 roles in the private 
commercial sector.26 
ACoBA was set up on a non-statutory basis in 1975. Sponsored by 
the Cabinet Office, with eight members appointed by the Prime 
Minister, it provides independent advice to senior Crown servants, and 
to all former Ministers, on any appointments they wish to take up 
within two years of leaving office.27 The work done by ACoBA has 
increased in constitutional significance. This is in part attributable to 
the rise of privatisation and contracting-out, which has made the 
boundary between public and private sectors more porous. Civil 
servants’ knowledge and skills are now more valuable in the private 
                                                          
25
 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/advisory-committee-on-business-appointments. 
26
 High Pay Centre, The Revolving Door and the Corporate Colonisation of UK Politics, 25
th
 March 2015, p.5. 
27
 HC Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, n. 22  above, at 4. 
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sector, perhaps particularly in markets prone to producing 
oligopolies.28 ACoBA can impose conditions, such as a waiting period, 
on Crown servants (but not on Ministers) seeking to take up posts in 
the private sector.29 That is significant, in that, for example, since 
1996, some 3,500 former senior military officers and Ministry of 
Defence officials have taken up positions in arms companies.30 
However, ACoBA has the power only to advise Ministers on their 
obligations. In 2015-16, ACoBA advised thirty-three Ministers respecting 
123 applications to take up positions outside politics.31 ACoBA’s advice 
is intended to do something to ensure that (a) appointments are not 
made in exchange for previous favours (which, as we will see, may 
involve bribery), that (b) improper advantages are not gained by the 
new employer from inside information possessed by the Minister, and 
that (c) the latter does not exploit his or her former contacts within 
government to the new employer’s advantage. We will examine these 
three areas of concern below. 
ACoBA has been criticised as a ‘toothless regulator’,32 but what 
action can it take, especially when it is Ministers whose conduct is in 
                                                          
28
 Stuart Wilks-Heeg, n.19  above, at 138. 
29
 Notably, though, ACoBA’s remit does not extend to more junior civil servants, even though it is such officials 
who may be responsible for negotiating contracts. 
30
 HC Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, n. 22  above, para 55. 
31
 HC Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, n. 22  above, para 22. 
32
 Ibid. 
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issue? ACoBA says that where it judges public concern over an 
appointment to be significant: 
It may recommend a delay in taking up the appointment, or that 
for a specified period the former Minister should stand aside from 
involvement in certain activities, for example, commercial 
dealings with his or her former Department, or involvement in 
particular areas of the new employer’s business.33 
Where Ministers are concerned, ACoBA effectively relies, for any 
deterrent effect it may achieve, on negative media coverage of an 
appointment in breach of its guiding principles; but such coverage is 
likely to be generated only when it is newsworthy, in relation to high-
profile individuals. Six of the 52 minsters taking up external 
appointments in 2010-11 simply failed to provide ACoBA’s with advance 
notification of their appointment.34  
In 2012, the Public Administration Select Committee 
recommended that ACoBA’s non-statutory advisory role should be 
replaced by a scheme of statutory regulation under an independent 
                                                          
33
 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/579754/
Business_appointment_rules_for_former_Ministers.pdf, para 7. 
34
 Stuart Wilks-Heeg, n. 19  above, at 137. 
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Commissioner, involving a code of conduct backed by a penalty 
regime.35 It recommended, for example, that: 
Appropriate civil sanctions should be available for contraventions 
of the legislation, and should include the possibility of sanctions 
against employers who hire former public servants in 
contravention of the rules (for example, exclusion from eligibility 
to bid for Government contracts).36 
Any and all increased powers should clearly apply to Ministers, and not 
just to Crown servants. That being so, decisions about the membership 
of ACoBA need to be taken out of the hands of the Prime Minister.37 
The Select Committee could have added that the new statutory body 
should have the power to sue the former public servant, or their 
employer, for any income (or equivalent financial gain) made in breach 
of the rules.38 Predictably, though, the Government rejected the 
Select Committee’s recommendations, as unlikely to produce a, 
‘tangible increase in compliance’.39 
3. Keeping Political Noses out of Troughs: the Criminal Sanction. 
                                                          
35
 HC Public Administration Select Committee, Business Appointment Rules, Third Report of Session 2012-13, 
HC 404, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmpubadm/404/404.pdf. 
36
 Ibid., para 79. 
37
 See text at n. 27 above. 
38
 See Jeremy Horder, n. 9  above, at 109. I call this kind of remedial action, ‘negation’. 
39
 The Public Administration Select Committee, Business Appointments Rules: Government Response to the 
Committee’s Third Report of Session 2012-13, First Special Report of Session 2014-15, HC 563, p. 9, para 32. 
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In France, a more republican approach is mandated by the Code Pénal. 
The mere creation, or toleration, of a conflict of interest between a 
public office holder’s official position, and his or her involvement in 
private enterprise, may attract significant criminal penalties. Article 
432-12 deals (in part) with ‘revolving in’, namely entering politics 
whilst retaining relevant business interests: 
The taking, receiving or keeping of any interest in a business or 
business operation, either directly or indirectly, by a person 
holding public authority or discharging a public service mission, 
or by a person holding a public electoral mandate who at the 
time in question has the duty of ensuring, in whole or in part, its 
supervision, management, liquidation or payment, is punished by 
five years' imprisonment and a fine of €75,000. 
Article 432-13 deals with ‘revolving out’ or pantouflage40: 
 An offence punished by two years' imprisonment and a fine of 
€30,000 is committed by any person who, in his capacity as a civil 
servant or agent or official of a public administration, and 
specifically by reason of his office, is entrusted with the 
supervision or control of any private undertaking, or with the 
conclusion of contracts of any type with a private enterprise, or 
                                                          
40
 ‘Putting on slippers’: using one’s public position to secure a comfortable position upon leaving politics: 
Stuart Wilks-Heeg, n. 19  above, at 135. 
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who by services, advice or investment takes or receives any part 
in such an enterprise, before the expiry of a period of five years 
following the end of his office. 
These provisions must be seen in context. Movement from the public to 
the private sector is common in France at the highest level. It has been 
estimated that 44.5 per cent of top managers in major French firms 
had previous experience in the senior civil service, being recruited 
externally and appointed to the top positions.41 Pantouflage is 
common. In a 20-year career, 40 per cent of public sector finance 
directors have at least one spell in the private sector, a percentage 
that rises to 60 per cent in the course of a 30-year career.42 By 
contrast, in Germany and the UK, only 3 per cent of top managers had 
previous civil service experience.43 A special ethics commission 
(Commission de Déontologie de la Fonction Publique) is in charge of 
ruling on pantouflage secondments, although this has not always been 
sufficient to prevent perceived conflicts of interest.44 It is, thus, 
                                                          
41
 M Bauer and B Bertin-Mourot, Vers un modèle européen de dirigeants? Ou Trois modèles contrastés de 
production de l'autorité légitime au sommet des grandes entreprises?:comparaison Allemagne, France, 
Grande-Bretagne. (Abacus: Paris, 1996). A lower figure is given by Davine and Ravasi, namely one-fifth of top 
managers (and a third of CEOs) with previous experience in the civil service: E Davoine and C Ravasi  ‘The 
Relative Stability of National Career Patterns in European Top Management Careers in the Age of 
Globalization: A Comparative Study in France/Germany/Great Britain and Switzerland’ [2013]  31 European 
Management Journal  152. 
42
 B Bouzidi, R Gary-Bobo, T Kamionka,  and A Prieto  ‘Le Pantouflage des Énarques: Une Première Analyse 
Statistique’, [2010] Revue Française d’Economie, Vol. XXV 115-146. 
43
. See E Davoine and C Ravasi, n. 41 above. 38 per cent of university-educated top managers in France 
are graduates of the École Polytechnique, HEC or ENA. For comparison purposes, only 14 per cent of 
university-educated top managers in the United Kingdom graduated from Oxford or Cambridge. 
44
 http://in-formality.com/wiki/index.php?title=Pantouflage,_corpsards_(France). 
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perhaps understandable that public procurement (which amounts to 
over 15% of GDP in France) is alleged to be the most corruption-prone 
sector in France.45  
Even so, let us consider the provisions on their legal merits. A 
point of special importance about the second provision (Article 432-13) 
is that the commission of the offence does not depend on the public 
servant being in public office when he or she does what is prohibited. 
Indeed, the whole point of the offence is to capture conduct engaged 
in when he or she has left office (‘who by services, advice or 
investment takes or receives any part in…an enterprise’) before the 
expiry of a five-year period. I will come back to this point below. As is 
now clear, in England and Wales, no offence (or civil wrong) would, 
without more, be committed at all in such circumstances. This may 
still be true, even if the rules governing the movement from public to 
private sectors are completely ignored by those taking up external 
appointments. It is worth noting that, of such conduct, one Minister, 
giving evidence to the Select Committee in 2012, said: 
                                                          
45
 https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/france/; Report from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, EU Anti-Corruption Report (February 2014), at 39 and 40 of the overall 
report and see Annex devoted to France. The proportion of tenders respecting which only one company made 
a bid (an acknowledged indicator of corruption) has been significantly higher in France, at 14%, than in other 
comparable European companies:, European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building, Public 
Integrity and Trust in Europe (Hertie School of Governance, Berlin 2015). 
. 
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I think there is a fairly clear set of principles. The clear principle 
is that the people who leave public office should not be able to 
take paid employment from an employer whom they might have 
been in a position to benefit when they were holding their public 
office and that there should be a period within which that is 
simply unacceptable.46 
 I have already suggested that ACoBA should have the power to dictate 
terms to Ministers as well as to Crown servants leaving office, as well 
as the power to negate the benefits of taking up external 
appointments when the rules for doing so have not been followed.47 
Going beyond this, is it possible that the offence of misconduct in 
office, or another corruption offence, could be applied to a Minister or 
Crown servant in an especially egregious case of rule-breaking?  
First there is the situation in which an external appointment 
relates to favours done when in office.48 If, when in office, a Minister 
gives an advantage to a private company, in the hope of obtaining 
position with that company (or a similar company) in the future, then 
his or her action will amount to bribery. Section 2(5) of the Bribery Act 
2010 covers cases in which, ‘in anticipation…of…accepting a financial 
or other advantage, a relevant function or activity is performed 
                                                          
46
 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmpubadm/404/404.pdf, para 34. 
47
 See text at n. 37  above. 
48
 See text at n. 38  above. 
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improperly’. To be motivated, in (say) awarding a contract to a 
company,49 by the prospect of securing a job in the future with that 
company or with a similar company, may in law be to perform one’s 
function improperly. That is because when one is in a position of trust, 
like a Minister, the inappropriateness of (some of) one’s reasons for 
undertaking certain actions can make those actions improper,50 for the 
purposes of the 2010 Act, even if one also undertook those actions for 
other (proper) reasons. Such cases are likely to turn on the question 
of, ‘what a reasonable person in the United Kingdom would expect in 
relation to the performance of the type of function or activity 
concerned’.51 In the present political climate, it would be an uphill 
struggle for defence Counsel to cast significant doubt on whether this 
test is satisfied, in such cases.  
It seems doubtful that ACoBA, still less Ministers and MPs more 
generally, are as fully aware as they should be of the potentially far-
reaching consequences of the 2010 Act in this respect. It may be said 
that it will be hard to prove that contracts were awarded in 
anticipation of employment in the private sector being given, further 
down the line (in France, there are around 30 convictions a year for 
                                                          
49
 Or even something far less advantageous. There is no de minimis principle in the Bribery Act 2010. So, even 
simply agreeing to meet corporate executives, in anticipation of gaining an advantage in the future, could 
amount to bribery contrary to section 2(5). 
50
 Bribery Act 2010, s4(2)(b). 
51
 Bribery Act 2010, s.5(1). 
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granting an unfair advantage: favouritism52). However, there is no de 
minimis principle in the 2010 Act. Suppose, for example, that a 
Minister agrees simply to meet company executives for exploratory 
talks. That agreement may itself constitute the improper performance 
of a function. The Minister’s conduct will be caught by section 2(5), if 
the agreement to meet is anticipated by the Minister to be an event at 
which it will be agreed with the company that he or she will be offered 
work, or even in some lesser way benefited, perhaps by being offered 
an interview at a later date.53 It is worth noting that if such conduct 
amounts to bribery on the part of a public official (whilst in office), 
then it should also amount to misconduct in office as well. 
What if, in a case of ‘revolving out’, the element of anticipated 
benefit – quid pro quo – simply cannot be proved? As we have seen, this 
is no obstacle to the imposition of criminal liability in French law.54 
Under French law, what is penalised is simply allowing a situation to 
arise in which personal and (former) public interest responsibilities 
conflict, whether or not benefit accrues therefrom to the individual or 
to the private business entity.55 For example, in 2009 François Pérol 
                                                          
52
 https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Ressources/File/429893 (August 2016), at 4. 
53
 See para 7.7 of the Ministerial Code, n. 23 above: ‘Ministers’ decisions should not be influenced by the hope 
or expectation of future employment with a particular firm or organisation’. 
54
 See text at n. 40  above. 
55
 See text at n. 40  above. There is also now a prohibition on acting as a lobbyist or consultant whilst holding 
public office: https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper; 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/01/bill-clean-french-politics-unveiled-government-refuses-fire/. 
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was accused of a conflict of interest when he became CEO of BPCE, 
France’s second-largest bank. BPCE had been created from the merger 
of two banks, Banque Populaire and Caisses d’Epargne. Pérol was said 
to have overseen the merger as an economic advisor to President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, but did not inform the ethics commission of his move. 
Pérol was prosecuted, although he was eventually acquitted in 
September 2015.56 
It has been authoritatively claimed that 25 former Ministers in 
the coalition Government of 2010-15 took paid roles in the sectors that 
they once oversaw,57 even though such conduct is frequently 
condemned at the highest level.58 What should be the law’s approach 
to such cases? Putting aside non-penal actions and remedies, 
mentioned above,59 there are two further sets of circumstances on 
which we must focus (raised by ACoBA60), where the threat to the 
political integrity of the state posed by ‘revolving out’ is such that 
criminal prosecution may be justified even in the absence of bribery. 
These circumstances concern what one might call the knowing misuse 
of the executive’s ‘intellectual property’: (i) information that comes 
                                                          
56
 The Economist, February 7
th
 2014, ‘Pantouflage. Tell it to the judge’;  http://in-
formality.com/wiki/index.php?title=Pantouflage,_corpsards_(France)#cite_note-4. 
57
 HC Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, n. 22  above, at 67. 
58
 See passage cited at n. 46 above. 
59
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to a public office holder in the course of their duties,61 and (ii) 
contacts that they make in the course of their duties.62 Suppose that a 
public office-holder has taken up an external appointment (revolved 
out), and has then gone on to use information or contacts acquired 
during his or her period in public office, in breach of a requirement not 
to do so set down or advised by ACoBA (or, obviously, where the 
appointment has been taken up without bothering to inform ACoBA 
properly or at all). Such is the damage done to the integrity of 
government by such conduct, it would be right to take action against it 
through criminal prosecution, even in the absence of proof that section 
2(5) of the Bribery Act 2010 applies. As the House of Commons Public 
Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee has said: 
[I]t is clearly unacceptable for public servants to use the contacts 
or experience they acquire in the public sector with the intention 
of securing a future private gain…It is this possibility which opens 
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them to the suspicion that they may have been conflicted during 
their time in public office.63 
A prosecution for misconduct in office would be the obvious and proper 
choice of charge in such cases.  
So far as the relevant elements of the offence are concerned, 
first, any misconduct must be ‘wilful’.64 Whilst ACoBA’s guidance does 
not play a particularly prominent role in codes of conduct applicable to 
public officials,65 this requirement is unlikely to prove a serious 
obstacle in the case of Ministers.66 The problem has not been making 
officials aware of the rules, but to make them take the rules 
seriously.67 More significantly, any misconduct must amount to an 
‘abuse’ or perhaps a betrayal of the public’s trust.68 It is submitted 
that misuse of the executive’s ‘intellectual property’ (information; 
contacts) supplies this element of betrayal. However, as indicated 
earlier, it seems likely that the misconduct offence, as presently 
defined,69 would not cover many of the cases currently under 
discussion, because the relevant acts – the misuse of contacts or 
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information – are engaged in after the Minister or Crown servant has 
left public office.  
As indicated earlier, this is not a problem under the Bribery Act 
2010, because section 4(3) says: 
Anything that a person does (or omits to do) arising from or in 
connection with that person's past performance of a relevant 
function or activity is to be treated for the purposes of this Act 
as being done (or omitted) by that person in the performance of 
that function or activity. 
So, for example, if in exchange for payment a former Minister engages 
in lobbying, within the prohibited two-year period,70 then this should 
be regarded as bribery – other things being equal – in virtue of section 
4(3).71 It would, though, would be open to a jury to find that engaging 
in lobbying was an improper performance of a (former) function even 
beyond that period, especially if the (mis)use of confidential 
information or contacts was involved. In passing, it is worth noting 
that, as in the example given earlier, it seems unclear that ACoBA, or 
any other official body, is in this respect aware of the potentially far-
reaching consequences of the 2010 Act.  
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It is submitted that the courts should extend the scope of the 
offence of misconduct so that it applies in similar circumstances: 
where (say) an ex Minister makes improper use of contacts or 
information acquired in the course of his or her former public role. 
This would bring English law closer to the apparently more stringent 
provisions applicable in France.72 The stock objection to such a 
suggestion is the spectre of retrospective criminalisation; but in the 
context of government and administration, that objection overlooks 
the resources of public law for prospective law-making. It would be 
possible for a third sector organisation, such as Transparency 
International,73 or indeed ACoBA itself, to seek a declaration that the 
offence of misconduct can in future be applied in such cases. Amongst 
the arguments would be (i) the public interest in treating bribery and 
misconduct in office in a similar way,74 so far as former office-holders 
are concerned, and (ii) the claim that the change effected by section 
4(3) in cases of bribery means that there is now no real and 
substantive unfairness or lack of warning to public sector defendants in 
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misconduct cases, if the offence is interpreted as applicable in a 
similar fashion. 
Here is an example of the kind of facts that may give rise to the 
problem, although there is no suggestion of criminal misconduct in the 
example itself. It concerns events leading up to the decision in 2017 by 
George Osborne MP, former Chancellor of the Exchequer, to accept a 
post as adviser to the BlackRock Institute, part of the BlackRock 
Investment Group, an international investment management 
company.75 In this case, Mr Osborne complied with the existing rules, 
and referred his potential move to ACoBA. However, ACoBA noted that 
Mr Osborne had been in contact with BlackRock, and with its 
competitors, to discuss the general economic situation, and sought 
assurance from the Treasury that none of Mr Osborne’s decisions were 
specific to BlackRock (they were not).76 ACoBA then advised Mr 
Osborne as follows: 
You should not draw on (disclose or use for the benefit of 
yourself or the organisation to which this advice refers) any 
privileged information available to you from your time in 
Ministerial office; and- for two years from your last day in 
Ministerial office you should not become personally involved in 
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lobbying the UK Government on behalf of BlackRock Investment 
Institute or any part of BlackRock group or its clients.77 
A number of difficulties arise in relation to this episode, even if one 
puts aside the unedifying prospect of former minsters lobbying, at any 
time in the future, on behalf of companies with whom they had 
dealings in office.78 As the Select Committee pointed out, a specific 
issue is that whilst none of Mr Osborne’s decisions whilst in office were 
specific to BlackRock, as Chancellor he clearly took decisions that had 
business implications for BlackRock.79 An example is the removal in 
2014 of tax restrictions on pensioners’ access to their pension pots, as 
a result of which BlackRock announced that the firm was, ‘uniquely 
positioned because of our multi-asset strategies and our product 
development specifically tailored to the retirement area’.80 More 
generally, it is unrealistic to suppose that someone involved day-to-day 
in economic decision-making over a number of years in Government, 
will later be able to separate out in their mind so-called ‘privileged 
information’ (supposedly not to be used) from their broader specialist 
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and general knowledge (which may be used) when advising their new 
employer. 
Going back to a point made earlier,81 what is needed is a 
requirement that it be positively in the public interest for a former 
Minister to take up an outside appointment, a requirement that would 
rule out taking up appointments simply to feather one’s nest. Having 
said that, it might not be right to take too stringent a view of the 
public interest test. Such a view would, as in France,82 rule out the 
taking up of an appointment with any public or private entity with 
which a Minister or Crown servant had specific dealings when in office; 
but such an approach may prove to be unworkable or unfair. For 
example, a Minister or Crown servant may have worked for the entity 
in question in the past and, having (say) left politics or the civil 
service, may wish merely to resume their old job.83 With appropriately 
rigorous safeguards in place concerning the use of any confidential 
information acquired, that does not seem wrong. To prevent such a 
possibility altogether is contrary to a broader understanding of ‘public 
interest’ – which treats restraint of trade with suspicion - outlined 
earlier.84 However, the length of time that a former Minister or Crown 
servant should be prevented from taking up an appointment should be 
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allowed to vary, rather than being arbitrarily fixed as at present. The 
length of time should depend on how long there will remain a conflict 
of interest for the individual taking up the appointment, having been 
privy to privileged information and contacts of potential benefit to the 
new employer.  
The House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional 
Affairs Committee has suggested that: 
It has become part of the culture in public life that 
individuals are entitled to capitalise on their public sector 
experience when they move into the private sector – the 
“new normal” – but there is a lack of clear boundaries 
defining what behaviour is or is not acceptable.85 
The sense of entitlement to which the Committee refers should be 
resisted, in so far as any attempt to capitalise on public sector 
experience when moving to the private sector is purely self-interested, 
with no public interest served by the move. So far as the Committee’s 
second point is concerned, it is, of course, a public law regulatory 
task, and not a task for the criminal law, to fine-tune the rules on 
when politicians and civil servants may move from the public to the 
private sector. However, I have identified three sets of circumstances 
(conferring advantages in the hope of reward; misuse of contacts; 
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misuse of information) in which completely unacceptable conduct 
attending such a move ought to fall within the scope of criminal 
misconduct in public office. 
4. Disregarding the Rules as Misconduct in Public Office 
I will now consider whether it should amount to misconduct in public 
office simply to disregard ACoBA, or to disregard its advice, whether or 
not some further wrong was done, such as misusing privileged 
information or contacts to benefit a new employer’s business. This is 
not a purely academic concern. The Chair of ACoBA, Baroness 
Browning, has been reported voicing the opinion that it should be a 
criminal offence intentionally to disregard ACoBA’s advice.86  
The Ministerial Code is quite clear on Ministers’ obligations in 
this respect. Para 7.25 states: 
[Ministers] must also seek advice from the independent Advisory 
Committee on Business Appointments (ACoBA) about any 
appointments or employment they wish to take up within two 
years of leaving office. Former Ministers must ensure that no new 
appointments are announced, or taken up, before the Committee 
has been able to provide its advice. 
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As indicated earlier, it would be salutary, were ACoBA to be given the 
power of negation, to claw back any and all benefits gained through 
employment taken up without prior consultation, or with grossly 
inadequate consultation (negation).87 Under the existing law, when (if 
ever) would a failure to consult ACoBA also amount to misconduct in 
public office? 
There have been two recent incidents raising this question. The 
first involves grossly inadequate consultation. Having ceased to be 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, in 2017 George Osborne MP took up the 
Editorship of a prominent daily newspaper, the Evening Standard. Mr 
Osborne informed ACoBA of his intention to take up his new position on 
13th March 2017, but the decision was announced by the newspaper 
itself only a few days later, on 17th March 2017 (the contract being 
signed on the 20th March 2017). ACoBA thus had no time to consider the 
ethical propriety of the appointment, putting Mr Osborne in breach of 
ACoBA’s rules.88 ACoBA was able to do little more that express its 
‘regret’ at Mr Osborne’s behaviour, saying that it was ‘not 
appropriate’,89 although it expressed the view that there was no 
evidence that Mr Osborne’s decisions when in office were influenced 
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by the possibility of this appointment. The House of Commons Public 
Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee also criticised the 
appointment as an ‘abuse’: 
We disapprove of the announcement of Mr Osborne’s 
appointment as Editor of the Evening Standard without waiting 
for ACoBA’s advice. This demonstrates disrespect for ACoBA and 
for the Business Appointment Rules and sets an unhelpful 
example to others in public life who may be tempted to do the 
same…the system remains open to similar abuses.90 
These turned out to be prophetic words. 
 On 9th July 2018, Boris Johnson MP resigned as Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs. On the 12th July 2018, he signed a contract with the 
leading daily newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, to write a weekly 
column for them for 46 weeks, a contract announced by the newspaper 
on the weekend of 14-15th July 2018. Mr Johnson also agreed to make 
himself available for public appearances and podcasts, to provide 
further benefit to the newspaper. It is, though, important to note that 
this was a return to a job he had previously had, but gave up upon 
becoming Foreign Secretary.91 In breach of the rules, Mr Johnson did 
not inform ACoBA in advance of his intention to take up the position 
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with the newspaper. Instead, he made a retrospective application for 
approval on the 26th July 2018.92 ACoBA’s rules state that, 
‘Retrospective applications will not normally be accepted’.93 ACoBA 
wrote to Mr Johnson, saying: 
The Committee considers it to be unacceptable that you signed a 
contract with the Telegraph and your appointment was 
announced before you had sought and obtained advice from the 
Committee, as was incumbent on you when leaving office under 
the Government’s Business Appointment Rules.94 
Putting on one side, for the moment, the disregard for ACoBA’s 
rules, there are clearly important differences between the Osborne 
case and the Johnson case. The Osborne case is arguably a less 
justifiable move into the private sector. First, the Osborne case is not 
one in which a Minister is simply returning to a previous role, by way of 
contrast with the Johnson case. As Mr Osborne, when taking up the 
Editorship, announced his intention at that time to remain an MP 
(although he resigned shortly thereafter),95 this is a simple case of 
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‘nest feathering’.96 Secondly, Mr Osborne’s job as Editor involved in-
principle control of the entire political direction of the newspaper 
(subject to any influence exercised, in that regard by the owner), a 
position of power very different from someone employed merely as a 
columnist, however popular, such as Mr Johnson.  
Turning now to the Ministers’ breaches of section 7.25 of the 
Ministerial Code (ACoBA’s rules),97 again, there is more that is of 
concern in the Osborne case than in the Johnson case. For example, 
ACoBA is clearly under a duty to have regard to any previous contact 
between a Minister and a private sector organisation, when the 
Minister was in post, in investigating the Minister’s subsequent decision 
to take up a position with that organisation. When he was Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, George Osborne pledged in 2015 that the Treasury 
would match pound-for-pound donations made by the public to the 
Evening Standard’s appeal on behalf of Great Ormond Street hospital.98 
That was a noble gesture, but one that casts a shadow over Mr 
Osborne’s subsequent decision to take up a leading role with the 
Evening Standard. Having said that, quite clearly ACoBA would equally 
have wished to assure the public from the outset, in the Johnson case, 
that he would not use information or contacts acquired during his time 
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in office in the writing of his column, an opportunity denied to them by 
Mr Johnson’s decision to seek only retrospective approval. One is left 
wondering whether there could ever be a case in which it could be in 
the public interest that a Minister, above all, should be entitled to 
seek wholly retrospective approval from ACoBA. 
In both these cases, there has been wilful misconduct in relation 
to the obligations of public office: a deliberate decision not to bother 
with compliance. The additional question is whether, in one or both of 
these cases, the misconduct is such as to amount to an abuse of public 
trust in the office holder.99 I have just indicated that there might be 
more to the Osborne case than to the Johnson case, so far as the 
additional question is concerned. More broadly, though, the cases raise 
the issue of the relationship between the two parts of the test. We are 
concerned with cases in which a public office-holder intentionally 
disregards rules he or she knows to have been made binding on him or 
her (the first part of the test) in the interests of maintaining public 
integrity. Does the attitude such conduct evinces in itself add to the 
sense in which, in law, there may have been an abuse of public trust 
(the second part of the test); or, would to take such an approach 
involve inappropriate double-counting, in point of fault? It is submitted 
that there need not necessarily be any illegitimate double-counting in 
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such an approach. The first part of the test involves a threshold 
question, namely whether D was – at a minimum - aware of the facts 
giving rise to his or her obligations, but nonetheless went on to breach 
those obligations.100 In some cases, though, D’s state of mind might go 
well beyond such a purely cognitive state, edging into an attitudinal 
disregard for the rule or rules in question. In such cases, there is an 
argument that a judge should be permitted to direct a jury that the 
latter state of mind can contribute to the sense in which, so far as the 
additional question is concerned, D’s misconduct amounts to an abuse 
of the public’s trust in the office-holder. 
 It is obvious that a prosecution for misconduct based purely on an 
attitude of disregard for rules would pose problems of uncertainty, in 
terms of the case that D has to meet. There must be independent 
evidence pointing to grave misconduct, albeit evidence itself capable 
of giving rise to an inference that D was contemptuous of rules 
designed to uphold public integrity in the discharge of office. In the 
Osborne and Johnson cases, there was such independent evidence, in 
the form of a real risk – surely, known to both individuals - that 
information or contacts gained during tenure of public office might be 
used to benefit the private entity for which the former Minister was 
now employed to assist in making profits. In the Osborne case, Mr 
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Osborne must also have been aware that there were legitimate 
questions to be answered concerning the relationship, if any, between 
the offer of the appointment and his decision, three years previously, 
to use public money to contribute to the employing newspaper’s 
charitable appeal.  
Having said that, when it comes to disregard of ACoBA’s rules, 
the case for commencing a prosecution would be stronger, in both 
cases, were the individuals to disregard the rules on appointments in 
the future, and hence to be guilty of having done so on more than one 
occasion. Such a ‘two-strikes’ rule of thumb for prosecution would 
permit ACoBA to incorporate into its guidance a warning that, if its 
rules are breached on more than one occasion, both instances will be 
referred to the Crown Prosecution Service. 
5. Prosecutors, Courts and MPs: A More Abrasive Relationship? 
It is generally true that most misconduct prosecutions are of lower 
level, unelected public officials.101 Historically, that reflects the 
important role for the offence in deterring and punishing betrayals of 
the trust placed by the monarch in public officials, appointed in his or 
her name, to act in good faith and in the public interest.102 However, 
there has always been a subsidiary role for the offence in holding high 
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level officials to account for betraying public trust.103 It is still true 
that, when UK prosecutors and courts become involved in such 
cases,104 they are acting in the name of the Monarch to deter and 
punish betrayals of his or her trust, a ‘top-down’ justification for 
prosecution. However, in such cases, there is also a sense in which a 
prosecution should reflect the ‘bottom-up’ interest of the general 
public in deterring high-level officials from relying on accountability 
only to themselves (marking their own homework).  
In that regard, in R v Chaytor,105 the Supreme Court found that 
Parliamentary Privilege did not extend to the submission of 
(fraudulent) expense claims by MPs. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
also made it clear that there could be no judicial intervention, casting 
aside Privilege, if an MP sought to make a claim that was ‘legitimate’ 
under a scheme that was itself corrupt or prone to corruption.106 For 
example, if MPs set up a scheme in which they may claim for expenses 
up to (say) £30,000 without supporting explanation or documentation, 
a claim duly brought under such a scheme cannot be challenged in 
court. That is a disappointingly supine approach on the part of the 
courts to the applicability of anti-corruption principles to the highest 
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reaches of the political establishment. It manifests a failure to 
summon sufficient courage to allow the law as a means to challenge 
grave breaches of public trust that government will be clean.107 What 
is the implication of this, in the current context? 
It seems to follow that whether rules established for taking up 
external appointments by ACoBA, or in the Ministerial Code, are good, 
bad, or very ugly, a charge of misconduct (in respect of a decision to 
take up an appointment) is bound to fail, if the Crown servant or 
Minister has followed those rules. What if, as in a number of instances 
given above, the rules have been broken? The personal nature of a 
Minister’s decision probably means that it falls outside the scope of 
judicial review, but I have argued that it is not beyond the scope of 
the misconduct offence. However, there seems to be little doubt that 
there is a strong reluctance, on the part of UK prosecutors and courts, 
to use the criminal law, and in particular the misconduct offence, to 
challenge high-end corruption in politics. That is wrong. 
It is largely an impression, but there appears to be markedly less 
such reluctance in the USA. The FBI has a dedicated Public Corruption 
Unit, and describes public corruption as its, ‘top investigative 
priority’.108 Further, it has become more common at state level to 
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establish public corruption ‘task forces’, multi-agency bodies designed 
to improve co-ordination at official level in the pursuit of cases.109 In 
Connecticut, for example, such a task force is comprised of 
representatives from the US Attorney General’s Office, the FBI, the US 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the US Department of 
Health and Human Services, the IRS Criminal Investigations Division and 
the US Postal Investigation office. In the USA, it is recognised that 
citizens have the, ‘intangible right of honest services’ on the part of 
politicians,110 and it has been argued that:  
Federal prosecutors are given broad weapons to prosecute public 
corruption, especially with respect to state and local corruption, 
where the pertinent statutes empowers them to challenge almost 
any unlawful, questionable or unethical conduct of a public 
official, subject to the prosecutor’s exercise of sound 
discretion.111 
Whilst ‘public corruption’ is understood broadly to include, for 
example, drug trafficking across borders, it is said also explicitly to 
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cover high-end corruption, such as, ‘how verdicts are handed down in 
courts’.112 Once again, though, some context is required here, as in the 
case of France.113  
Lobbying activity enjoys First Amendment protection in the USA, 
whilst the regulation of lobbying is justified by the need for the public 
to be protected by being given information about who is engaged in 
lobbying.114 As Justice Warren put it: 
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual 
members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad 
pressures to which they are regularly subjected. Yet full 
realization of the American ideal of government by elected 
representatives depends to no small extent on their ability to 
properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise the voice of the 
people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special 
interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as 
proponents of the public weal.115 
A key driver of ‘favoured treatment’ is the participation of former 
members of the legislature in advocacy on behalf of special interest 
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groups. The practice has its defenders,116 but to regulate this 
phenomenon, the legislature has intervened to impose restrictions and 
transparency requirements on lobbyists, through (for example) the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 and the Honest Leadership and Open 
Government Act 2007 (‘the 2007 Act’).117  
GRECO has described the requirements for lobbying disclosure in 
America as, ‘probably more [extensive] than in any other country’, 
whilst recognising its particular importance there, in virtue of a high 
degree of private sector involvement in the process leading up to the 
passage of legislation.118 At the time of the 2007 Act, some 43% of 
former legislators had become lobbyists. However, by 2016, one study 
found that the numbers of former law-makers now working in the 
lobbying industry had risen to 47%.119 One reason for this is the 
perception that enforcement will be weak. The 2007 Act established 
criminal penalties of fines, or imprisonment for up to five years, or 
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both, for knowing and corrupt failure to comply with restrictions on 
lobbying activity. These restrictions included a ‘cooling off’ period 
between leaving government employment and engaging in such 
activity.120 However, in 2015, a study revealed that around 30% of 104 
former congressional members and so-called staffers, whose cooling 
off periods were due to end, were already actively engaged in lobbying 
activity, with 13 out of 104 openly registered as lobbyists. The 
requirement to prove, ‘knowing and corrupt’ failure to comply with 
the lobbying rules sets a very high bar that has proved very difficult to 
surmount.121 
 Nonetheless, whilst hardly a routine event, the prosecution and 
conviction of politicians or other high state officials for corruption, 
even if not corruption directly connected to lobbying, is not especially 
remarkable in the USA.122 In 2010, public corruption cases handled by 
the FBI resulted in more than 900 convictions, most of which were at 
the federal level.123 So far as elected officials are concerned, to give a 
recent example, on 28th August 2018, the former Pennsylvania State 
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Treasurer, Robert McCord was convicted on two counts of attempted 
extortion and sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, in connection 
with his campaign to become Governor. He had sought campaign funds 
from a law firm and from a property management company, 
threatening to use his position as Treasurer to damage the businesses 
economically if they did not contribute enough.124 Turning to the 
judiciary, on August 23rd 2018, former West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals Justice Menis E. Ketchum II was prosecuted and convicted of 
wire fraud (an offence commonly used to target different types of 
corruption, as well as ‘fraud’ as it is understood in England and 
Wales).125 Justice Ketchum was convicted in respect of repeated 
personal use of a State of West Virginia vehicle and State fuel credit 
card over the course of 2011 through 2014, in connection with his 
travel from his home in Huntington, West Virginia to and from a private 
golf club in western Virginia. The case provides a stark contrast to the 
tolerant attitude of the CPS towards over £1 million of expense abuses 
spread across 53% of MPs in the ‘rotten Parliament’ of 2005-2010.126 
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 Of the successful prosecution of Robert McCord, US Attorney 
David J Freed and Michael T Harpster, Special Agent in Charge of the 
FBI’s Philadelphia Division, said: 
McCord’s official actions to benefit his friends and punish his foes 
compromised the integrity of the Treasury and directly damaged 
the citizens of Pennsylvania.  Although public corruption 
investigations are lengthy, difficult and complex, they have been 
and will remain a priority of our office.  Our oaths demand it and 
the public deserves it…The FBI will continue to investigate public 
corruption and hold those responsible accountable, to send a 
message to public officials that crime truly doesn’t pay.127 
Regrettably, prosecutors in the UK simply do not have this kind of 
attitude or approach to political corruption.128 My argument has been 
that they have the legal resources to turn anti-corruption ideals such 
as those of the FBI into a reality in the UK. So, it is their attitude, as 
well as that of the courts, that needs to change. 
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